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RECENT CASES
LABOR LAW-FEDE.L CouRT ExJOINS LouisiwxA SmRmp'S
INTERFERENCE WITH PEACEFUL PICKETING
A Louisiana sheriff decreed that "there was to be no picketing around
there" and proceeded to enforce his rule by twice dispersing a peaceful
picket line of union members at a non-union interstate construction project.
On the second occasion, the picketers were arrested on a charge of dis-
turbing the peace, although the sheriff later asserted other grounds for the
arrests-obstruction of a highway I and violation of the Landrum-Griffin
Act.2 In a class suit brought by the picketers 3 under the Civil Rights
Statutes,4 a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against
further interference by the sheriff. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, without passing on the merits, affirmed the grant of the preliminary
injunction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in find-
ing that the picketing was probably constitutionally protected.5 Wooten v.
Ohler, 303 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1962).
The grant of a preliminary injunction can be reversed only on the
ground that the trial judge abused his discretion; this determination, how-
ever, is necessarily influenced by the probable outcome of the litigation.6
Jurisdiction to protect constitutionally protected activity, here picketing,
1 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.97 (1951).
2 The sheriff alleged that the picketing for recognition or organization resulted
in refusal of outside employees to make deliveries to the picketed site. See 73 Stat.
525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (Supp. II, 1961).
3The Briefs for Appellants and Appellees denominate the action as being under-
taken "on behalf of all other individuals similarly situated as a class."
428 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958); 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 14 Stat. 27 (1866), 17 Stat.
13 (1871), 18 Stat. 337 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-84 (1958).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the depri-
vation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens ....
28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (1958).
5 The court also held that neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the
Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded the district court from taking jurisdiction of a civil
rights action in which a state peace officer allegedly invaded constitutional rights.
6 Instant case at 761-62.
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is conferred upon the federal courts by the Civil Rights Acts.7 However,
in deference to considerations of federalism and the traditional self-limita-
tion of equity powers, federal courts often abstain from enjoining depriva-
tion of civil rights by state law enforcement officials. Even a clear invasion
of a basic constitutional right does not necessarily warrant injunction in
this situation,8 nor does the threat of multiple prosecutions.9 A threatened
state criminal prosecution will not be enjoined unless the plaintiff establishes
"a danger of irreparable injury 'both great and immediate.'" 10 Federal
courts also decline to restrain the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional
statutes pending authoritative interpretation in the state courts that might
obviate federal determination of constitutional issues." A principle har-
monizing most cases in which injunctions have been granted is the practical
denial of redress in state courts,' 2 but several recent decisions, relaxing
traditional notions of equitable abstention, have granted injunctions in civil
rights cases without regard to the availability of state remedies.'2
The present case is the first in which a federal court has enjoined state
criminal processes directed against allegedly constitutionally protected
picketing.14 Although jurisdiction was expressly predicated upon the Civil
Rights Statutes, the issue of equitable abstention was entirely ignored.15
The court, treating as sham the charged violations of state law, regarded
7 See note 4 supra.
8 E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Galfas v. City of
Atlanta, 193 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1952).
9 E.g., AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 594-95 (1946) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
mpra note 8, at 165.
10 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra note 8, at 164. Even irreparable injury
will not justify injunction of pending prosecutions. E.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
274 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1927); Ackerman v. International Longshoremen's Union, 187
F.2d 860, 867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951). See generally Note,
Federal Injunctions Against State Criminal Proceedings, 4 STAN. L. Rv. 381 (1952).
11 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
'2E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (dictum) (civil rights legis-
lation designed to grant federal damage remedy when state remedy unavailable in
practice).
'3 The position that equitable abstention does not apply to civil rights actions
against state criminal law enforcers appears in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707,
713 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55
(D. Kan.), appeal disnissed, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167, 179 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Alesna v. Rice, 74 F. Supp. 865, 870-71
(D. Hawaii 1947) (dictum), affd, 172 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1949). The Supreme
Court affirmance in Browder v. Gayle, supra, indicates recognition of at least some
area in which federal courts may enjoin unconstitutional conduct of state officials
without a prior test in state courts.
1 4 In United Elec. Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946),
picketers seeking to enjoin state officers on grounds of lack of constitutional violation
and equitable abstention were granted no relief. No other reported cases present
these issues in a similar framework.
15The trial court at least suggested the issue in its finding No. 9: "The peti-
tioners are suffering irreparable injury by interference with their right to peacefully
picket . . . . " Brief for Appellants, p. 4. (Emphasis added.)
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the sheriff's elimination of the picket line as purely a manifestation of his
own anti-union attitudes.'8 Consequently, it found no real issue of state
statutory construction requiring abstention in favor of state courts.
The court may have tacitly concluded that the inadequacy of state
remedies and the potential irreparable injury in the present case warranted
federal injunctive relief. Were the sheriff permitted to continue to disperse
the picketers and to detain them only temporarily,17 they would have no
immediate opportunity to test his actions in state proceedings initiated
against them.' 8 Even if the picketers were charged and eventually ac-
quitted in the state courts,19 the sheriff's harassment during the delay could
deprive them of important tactical advantages, particularly since the value
of picketing at a construction job decreases as the job nears completion.
Furthermore, the availability of a state injunctive remedy for the picketers
was doubtful under Louisiana law.m
Unfortunately, the court's silence on these issues leaves open the pos-
sibility that it totally ignored abstention principles and the question of
available state redress. A minority of federal courts literally interpret the
Civil Right Statutes to grant federal courts primary responsibility for all
enforcement of civil rights, thus precluding consideration of equitable
abstention in civil rights actions. 21 The Supreme Court has held that the
unavailability of adequate state remedies is no longer prerequisite to civil
rights damage recovery,22 but it may still be prerequisite to a civil rights
16 Instant case at 764-65. Mere bad faith in state law enforcement does not
itself justify interference by the federal courts. Ackerman v. International Long-
shoremen's Union, 187 F.2d 860, 864-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
17 Trial court finding No. 9 states that the defendants' similar conduct in prior
instances, on one occasion giving rise to a similar injunction, created a likelihood
that their course of conduct would continue to threaten plaintiffs. Brief for Appellant,
pp. 3-4.
Is The model harassment case is Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
19 Brief for Appellees, p. 13. The terms of the injunction reached only threatened
interference by the sheriff; pending prosecutions for disturbing the peace were not
affected. See note 10 supra.
20 The weight of Louisiana authority requires an unconstitutional statute, not
merely an unconstitutional application in order to enjoin a threatened prosecution.
E.g., Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Bd., 237 La. 467, 111 So. 2d 505 (1959);
Godfrey v. Ray, 169 La. 77, 124 So. 151 (1929). Contra, Capell v. Molony, 154 La.
420, 423, 97 So. 595, 596 (1923) (dictum). There is some indication, however, that
an injunction would lie if criminal charges are not pursued. Theodos v. Bossier
City, 232 La. 1059, 1068, 95 So. 2d 825, 828 (1957) (dictum) ; Louisiana Oyster &
Fish Co., v. Police Jury, 126 La. 522, 527, 52 So. 685, 687 (1910) (dictum). Even
if the state substantive remedy exists, possible delay in obtaining it may still destroy
the picketers' tactical advantage.
21 See note 13 supra.
2 2 1n Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court granted relief
in damages against local police officers for violation of fourth amendment protection
from illegal search and seizure, despite the availability of state civil actions. Before
Monroe, complainants might have had to sue in state courts for false arrest and
assault and battery, see Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1959). But ef.
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).
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equitable action.P The disruptive effect of damage suits is slight since
damages for the abridgment of a personal constitutional right are apt to be
too speculative to encourage bringing such actions. Furthermore, since
damages are assessed against state officers in their individual capacities,
interference with state governmental processes is, at most, indirect. An
injunction, however, restrains future state law enforcement and may result
in litigation in federal contempt proceedings of trivial state police activities
allegedly violative of the injunction.24 Premature federal injunctions tend
to discourage the exercise of the states' responsibility for protection of con-
stitutional rights in matters of local concern.
25
Whether the court adopted an expansive view of federal equitable
jurisdiction or adhered to the traditional abstention rationale by finding the
state remedies inadequate, factors in the present case beyond the obvious
harm to the individual picketers might especially impel a federal court to
grant injunctive relief. The pervasiveness of federal labor legislation may
induce federal courts to exercise preemptive jurisdiction in this area to
foster uniformity of regulation. 26 Federal judicial sensitivity to labor rights
may also prompt recognition of the tendency of the sheriff's pattern of
interference to dissuade other union members from engaging in constitu-
tionally protected picketing. And the vagueness of the sheriff's rule in-
tensifies the deterrence of protected picketing since no notice is given as to
the ambit of its proscription. Although potential picketers may have
neither a state nor a federal cause of action for deprivation of an alleged
constitutional right that they have not attempted to exercise, their rights
are protected by granting relief in the present class action.
2 7
23 In Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962), although granting in-
junction on the basis of Monroe, the court did so only because the action was also
one for damages. Had the action been for injunction alone, the court would have
applied the abstention doctrine since a state court could then find the officials' conduct
to be unauthorized without reaching the federal question. Id. at 646. It is difficult
to understand why the official action would not be equally unauthorized in a damage
action, thereby removing the defense of official immunity in any state action.
2 4 In the instant case the injunction prevented interference with picketing, pro-
vided the officials were not hampered in "the lawful discharge of the duties of their
offices." Instant case at 761 n.4. According to the appellant, the picketers' patrolled
near a curve in a heavily travelled road with a posted speed limit of sixty miles per
hour. Thirteen trucks were hauling cement to the job site and a deputy sheriff was
required to direct traffic. Brief for Appellant, p. 6. After enjoining the sheriff's
conduct, the federal court might well find itself deciding in contempt proceedings
whether the sheriff properly charged the picketers with obstructing a public highway
under LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 14.97 (1951).
25 See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176, 178 (1959); City of Miami
v. Sutton, 181 F2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1950); United Furniture Workers v. Gates,
75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948) (dictum) (injunction granted reluctantly since
local police should have wide latitude in law enforcement).
26 See discussion of preemption of state regulation in text accompanying notes
44-61 infra.
27The present injunction protected similar picketing by other union members
against other employers within the sheriff's jurisdiction. Instant case at 761 n.4.
Cf. Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 787 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Coke v. City of Atlanta,
184 F. Supp. 579, 583 (N.D. Ga. 1960) ; 62 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 907 (1962).
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As to the probable outcome of the litigation, the picketing in the present
case presents an exceptionally strong case for constitutional protection. In
Thornhill v. Alabama,28 peaceful picketing was broadly equated with free
speech. Subsequent cases gradually qualified this protection as violence
and the illegal purposes of peaceful picketing became objects of state regu-
lation.m2 9 Because the physical existence of a picket line imparts persuasive
force independent of the message of the picketers, a lesser threat to public
peace justifies regulation of picketing than is needed to support the curtail-
ment of other constitutionally protected free speech. 0 The picketing in the
present case, however, was entirely peaceful, and the alleged interference
with traffic, even if proved, would not have approached a threat to public
order. 1 The sheriff's rule is additionally vulnerable to constitutional attack
because of its generality. 2  Although states may dearly halt isolated
breaches of the peace arising from picketing, only once has the Supreme
Court permitted violence to justify a blanket prohibition of all affiliated
picketing that was otherwise constitutionally protected.33 An increased
quantum of violence is required for the present type of restraint lest the
restriction encompass peaceful picketing which the state has no legitimate
interest in regulating.3 4
Peaceful picketing may also be regulated when its purpose conflicts
with any of a broad range of valid state objectives.3 5 The Supreme Court's
28310 U.S. 88, 98-105 (1940). See generally Farmer & Williamson, Picketing
and the Injunctive Power of State Courts-From Thornhill to Vogt, 35 U. DEr.
L.J. 431 (1958); Williams, Freedom to Speak-But Only Ineffectively, 38 TEXAs
L. REv. 373, 382-84 (1960).
29 See generally Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
30 "Pure" free speech may be immune from restriction by the state even though
some violence exists. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Picketing, however, may be regulated if "reasonable and necessary
to maintain the peace." United Elec. Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235, 241
(D. Conn. 1946). Compare Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948), with United Elec. Workers v. Baldwin, supra at 241.
1 "[M]inor inconveniences to traffic" do not justify abridgment of the right to
picket. United Elec. Workers v. Baldwin, supra note 30, at 244. See note 24 supra.
82 An isolated invasion of constitutional rights might not intimidate other picketers
in the exercise of their right to picket, see note 27 .upra and accompanying text,
and would probably give rise to a damage action rather than injunction, see notes
22-24 supra and accompanying text.
33Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941); cf.
Chauffeurs Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958), reversing 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d
817 (1957), 107 U. Pc. L. REV. 127. A blanket prohibition without justification is
clearly unconstitutional. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
84 See Cafeteria Workers v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
35 Such as, "restriction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a
labor dispute arises," Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1942) ;
or observance of a state antitrade restraint law, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). In both International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 (1957), and Building Serv. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950),
the Court approved state regulation of the picketing because of its illegal purpose--
in those cases, forcing the employer to unionize in violation of the state policy of
maintaining employee free choice in selection of bargaining representatives.
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attitude toward state action against peaceful picketing resembles more its
limited review of state economic regulation than the usually meticulous
protection accorded personal freedoms. A state policy asserted against
picketing will be upheld unless it is clearly "inconsistent with rooted tradi-
tions of a free people." 36 Moreover, the Court has been reluctant to inter-
fere with a state court's factual determination that the purpose of particular
picketing was "illegal." 37 The only practical constitutional limitation upon
state regulation of peaceful picketing forbids an overly broad prohibition,
particularly when the supporting state policy has not been authoritatively
articulated.3 8 The Supreme Court has suggested that state policies asserted
against picketing must be declared by either state courts or legislatures,30
presumably to ensure the enlightened deliberation obviously absent from
the sheriff's informal rule. Had the sheriff asserted a properly articulated
state policy to justify his interference, the picketers might have lost their
federal protection since the abstention doctrine would then require a fed-
eral court to defer to a state court for interpretation of state law. 40
A federal civil rights action brought to enjoin state criminal regulation
of peaceful picketing is thus contingent upon meeting the uncertain criteria
for the exercise of federal equitable jurisdiction.41 The plaintiff must also
establish that the state policy asserted against the picketing is not au-
thoritatively articulated or that it unduly encroaches upon protected picket-
ing.42 Furthermore, in regulating picketing the several states may manifest
differing, even conflicting, policies, although none may be unconstitu-
tional.43 This apparent possibility of inconsistent disposition of factually
similar cases can be eliminated in cases involving interstate commerce.
36 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1950). See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957).
37 Id. at 296 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38Id. at 293-95.
3 9 See id. at 293 (dictum).
4 0 For example, had the sheriff asserted the state labor policy that employees
be guaranteed freedom in self-organization, the federal court might have been bound
to refuse the present injunction. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 (1957), and in Building Serv. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950),
the Supreme Court held that a state court could enjoin peaceful recognitional picket-
ing, since the purpose attributed to the picketing-to force the employer to coerce
his non-union employees to join the union-was contrary to statute. Louisiana has
a similar statute, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.822 (1951). Testimony in the present
case tended to establish the same union objective. Brief for Appellants, p. 14; see
instant case at 760-61. If the sheriff had proposed the above statutory justification,
the correctness of his application of the state law would be a matter for the state
courts. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). Immediate federal protection
of the picketing would therefore be precluded, and approval of the sheriff's inter-
pretation by the state courts would bring the case within the rule of Gazzam and
Vogt.
41 See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text.
42 See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
43 See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
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Decreasing federal supervision of state regulation of picketing under the
Thornhill doctrine has been offset by development of the doctrine of pre-
emption of state regulation by federal legislative occupation of the labor
field.4 4 Any activity "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [Labor-Manage-
ment Relations] Act,"-which would include the present picketing and the
interference with truck deliveries alleged by the sheriff 4 -- lies within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.4 6 In the
absence of violence, state courts may not enjoin such conduct,47 because
the goals of expert centralized administration and uniform application of
rules and remedies are most readily realized by initial NLRB adjudication
in all cases.48 Since state court injunctions are prohibited by the preemp-
tion theory, the sheriff's adjudication of a labor dispute under the guise of
state criminal law enforcement seems equally preempted.4 9 The sheriff's
other contention-that the picketing violated the Landrum-Griffin Act-, 50
although irrelevant to the issue of constitutionally protected picketing, is
squarely comprehended by the preemption doctrine.5 ' The court expressed
doubt that the sheriff could enforce federal labor legislation, but declined to
rule on the question since it was not clearly presented by the facts.52
At least one court has declared that an alleged deprivation of non-
constitutional rights secured by national labor legislation justifies a civil
44 See generally Farmer & Williamson, supra note 28, at 431-32, 453-55; Meltzer,
The Suprene Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59
CoLUm. L. REv. 6 (1959).
45A subsequent action brought by the Regional Director of the NLRB to enjoin
this picketing was dismissed. Lebus v. Building Trades Council, 199 F. Supp. 628
(E.D. La. 1961).
46 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
4 7 Hotel Union v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 358 U.S. 270 (1959).
4 8 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959)
(dictum); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1953) (dictum).
49 Of course, had breach of the peace or substantial obstruction of traffic been
established in the present case, local interest would have warranted state injunction
of the conduct, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956),
as well as state criminal law enforcement, United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665, 668-69 (1954) (dictum). State control over vio-
lence does not necessarily extend to control over trespass to property. See Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957) (question reserved).
Differing results have been reached in state courts. Compare State v. Williams, 37
CCH Lab. Cas. ir 65708 (Crim. Ct. Baltimore, Md. 1959), with People v. Goduto,
21 Ill. 24 605, 174 N.E2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961), 60 MicH. L. Rzv.
1010 (1962).
5 0 Instant case at 763. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
51 The test of constitutionality of state restriction of peaceful picketing is whether
the purpose of the picketing contravenes state policy. Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957). The test of violation of the Landrum-Griffin proviso is
whether in fact employees of other firms were prevented from making deliveries.
Lebus v. Building Trades Council, 199 F. Supp. 628, 633 (E.D. La. 1961). But cf.
Kennedy v. Retail Clerks Union, 194 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Retail Clerks
Union (Barker Bros. Corp.), 138 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1962).
.52 Instant case at 763-64.
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rights suit,5 but the Civil Rights Acts were designed to protect from state
invasion fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights,5 not rights bestowed
by federal legislation under the commerce power. Nor can the supremacy
clause properly support a civil rights action, since no personal constitutional
right guarantees enforcement of the preemption doctrine, and the ultimate
determination of the availability of state remedies depends upon congres-
sional intent.5 5 Preemption will, therefore, not support a civil rights action;
but it does ground original federal jurisdiction under section 1337 of the
Judicial Code to enjoin state criminal law enforcement against picketing,
since the doctrine derives from judicial interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act, a law regulating commerce.56 Although the actual dispute
with the state peace officer would not be initially cognizable by the
NLRB, 57 the sheriff's attempt to decide the underlying labor issues does
usurp the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction.58
To summarize, the picketing in the present case is apparently con-
stitutionally protected, but situations are conceivable in which state regula-
tion of picketing would be constitutionally permissible, even though the
state could not regulate similar picketing when challenged by federal pre-
emption.5 9 The preemption doctrine, then, affords more consistent protec-
tion to picketing affecting interstate commerce than do the Civil Rights Acts,
since-the preemption standard of arguable coverage by the federal statute is
5 3 United Elec. Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D. Conn. 1946)
(alternative ground of jurisdiction).
54 See Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900) ; Note, The Proper Scope
of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1291-93 (1953).
55 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 501 (1953) (dictum); Farmer &
Williamson, mupra note 28, at 455.
56 "The district courts shall 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action or pro-
ceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting com-
merce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958), Denton v. City
of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1956) (alternative ground of jurisdiction).
In Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Board founded an injunc-
tive action upon § 1337 against the employer's enforcement of a state court injunction
since the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board exclusive jurisdiction. In
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955), an action
by a union to enjoin the employer's state court action against the union's peaceful
picketing was similarly based. In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1958) prevented federal injunction of state court proceedings in the
absence of a specific statutory mandate. However, the dissenters, finding such a
mandate, emphasized that the district court clearly had jurisdiction under § 1337 even
though the action was brought by a private party. Id. at 521 (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting). Cf. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Dalton, 206 F. Supp.
629 (W.D. Mo. 1962) ; Grand Rapids City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Howlett, 137 F. Supp.
667 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
5 7 Instant case at 762.
58 In Lebus v. Building Trades Council, 199 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. La. 1961), an
NLRB petition for a preliminary injunction against this picketing was denied on the
merits. There was no indication that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction of the
dispute.
5o Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957),
with Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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far broader than the flexible constitutional standard, which is subject to
varying state regulatory justifications. Hence, application of the preemption
doctrine to state criminal law enforcement against peaceful picketing would
relegate the decreasing constitutional protection of this activity to cases
affecting only intrastate commerce. State criminal jurisdiction over peace-
ful picketing would be coterminous with state civil jurisdiction, the area
in which preemption has thus far operated.O Since the determination of
the scope of preemption in most cases would properly be considered a
matter of statutory interpretation, disposal of the case on this ground also
avoids the decision of a constitutional question.6' Finally, the preemption
doctrine renders inappropriate the concepts of federalism that inhibit federal
courts from enjoining threatened state criminal law enforcement against
peaceful picketing since the essence of the preemption doctrine is uni-
formity-in legislative and administrative regulation and in subsequent
judicial interpretation-which can best be achieved in the federal forum.
LABOR LAW-NLRB ORDERS PAY FRom DISCmE UNTIL
E PLoYEEs Fi-D SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT WORK To REMEDY
ANTI-UNION MILL SHUTDOWN
Following a union victory in a hotly contested representation election,
the shareholders of the Darlington Manufacturing Company liquidated the
business. The National Labor Relations Board, denying an absolute man-
agement right to go out of business, found that, despite a generally unfavor-
able economic picture, the company would not have shut down but for the
union's successful organizational activity; it therefore held that the com-
pany had violated section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations
Act I by discriminating in employment to discourage union activity. The
Board imposed on the liquidated company an unprecedented pay liability
to continue until the discharged workers could obtain substantially equiv-
alent employment. However, since it found that Darlington was owned and
controlled by a parent company,2 the Board also held the parent liable for
pay until it offered the discharged workers similar employment in its other
plants, and ordered the parent to place the names of such workers on a
6o60 Micn. L. Rxv. 1010, 1014 (1962).
61 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
1 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
2 On review, the court may sustain the award on this corporate entity theory
alone, and treat as dictum the alternate holding of a continuing liability for Darlington
as the sole employer. Nevertheless, since the Board has clearly articulated a sig-
nificant departure from its previous position on the individual employer's liability
for a discriminatory total shutdown, this Comment will deal only with that aspect
of the case.
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preferential hiring list.3 Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 23
(Oct. 18, 1962).
4
Although neither the language nor the legislative history of the Wagner
Act explicitly restricts an employer's right to go out of business,5 a plant
shutdown because of union activity contravenes the congressionally deter-
mined policy that workers in industries affecting commerce shall be free
to engage in protected union activities and to bargain collectively.6 It is
now settled that an employer cannot threaten to shut down should the
union win a representation election; 7 nor can it bargain over a valid eco-
nomic shutdown by offering to reopen should the workers agree to remain
unorganized.8 If an employer had an absolute right to go out of business
for any reason, including the unionization of workers, it would be per-
mitted to inform its workers of that fact; 9 instead, a House subcommittee
recently considered such a communication so unfair a labor practice that it
urged the Board to seek injunctions against such employer threats.'0 To
3 Member Leedom apparently believed that the pay award against the parent,
Deering-Milliken, would terminate when the names of the discharged workers were
placed on a preferential hiring list. Instant case at 29 (opinion dissenting in part).
The language of the Board, however, suggests that the entity's pay liability will
endure until the workers obtain substantially equivalent employment and will be tolled
only by an offer of such employment, not by the mere formality of preparing a hiring
list. Instant case at 19-25. In addition to an offer of employment without loss of
seniority rights, Deering-Milliken must offer to pay the travel and moving expenses
entailed in taking employment in another community. Instant case at 24.
4 Significantly, all members of the Board agreed that the closing was motivated
by a desire to avoid dealing with the union. Both dissenting members, Leedom and
Rodgers, adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that the alleged parent, Deering-
Milliken, did not occupy a single-employer status with Darlington. Member Leedom,
while agreeing that the dosing was an unfair labor practice, dissented from the
extension of Darlington's pay liability past the date of complete shutdown. Member
Rodgers insisted that an employer has an absolute right to go out of business, and
therefore that a discriminatory shutdown could not be an unfair labor practice.
5 Supporters of the act in both Houses of Congress did state that an employer
could not be compelled to remain in business, but they did so in order to demonstrate
that an employer could not be forced to make any particular agreement, rather than
that he had an absolute right to leave business. See 79 CONG. REc. 7673 (1935)
(remarks of Senator Walsh) ; 79 CONG. REc. 9682 (1935) (remarks of Representa-
tive Griswold). But see instant case at 31 n.57 (Member Rodgers, dissenting).
6 See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958). In addition, a discriminatory shutdown discourages the organi-
zation of workers, prevents equalization of bargaining power, causes diminution of
employment and wages, and prevents the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions betveen industries.
7 See, e.g., McGregor & Werner, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 50 L.R.R.M. 1002
(1962), 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. ff 11129; Worth Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 444 (1961);
STAFF OF Housa Comm. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH CONG., Isv SEss., FEDERAL
LABOR LAws-LEGsLATIvE ACTION AFFECTING LABOR, 1789-1960, at 3 (Comm. Print
1961).
8 See North Country Motors, Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479 (1961).
9 For example, the Board has upheld the right of an employer to inform economic
strikers that unless they return by a certain date it will exercise its legal right to
replace them permanently. Robinson Freight Lines, 114 N.L.R.B. 1093 (1955).
10 STAFF OF SuBcomm. ON THE NLRB, HousE Comm. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, 87TH CONG., IST SEss., ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT BY THE NLRB 3 (Comm. Print 1961).
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allow a business to operate on condition that its workers remain unor-
ganized and to shut down should they engage in union activities not only
destroys the workers' right to self-organization after an election, but
tolerates the imposition of an implicit deterrent to any organizational
activity. Although some courts have doubted that a total cessation of
business operations could ever be an unfair labor practice," the effect on
the employees involved is the same whether the company ceases one part
of its operations or closes completely, although different remedies may be
appropriate for the two cases.' 2 Therefore, given a discriminatory motive
and an equally deterrent effect on union activity, there should be no greater
right to abandon all operations than to abandon some.
The determination whether a particular shutdown was discriminatorily
motivated is often complicated by the necessity of drawing intricate factual
inferences. Since an employer may shut down for "a good reason, a poor
reason, or no reason at all" 13 so long as its motive is not discriminatory,
the bare fact that the shutdown occurs immediately after the commence-
ment of an organizational drive or after a representation election should
not alone sustain the factual inference that the closing was motivated by
a desire to avoid unionization.' 4 The courts of appeals and the Board have
agreed that such a shutdown is unlawful when the employer fabricates
"economic" reasons for its decision,15 or, even though nondiscriminatory
reasons existed, when the company either threatened to liquidate should
the union win,' 6 or prior to the organizing campagin engaged in activities
that evidenced a positive intent to remain in business.' 7 But when the
employer had considered a shutdown before the advent of the union and
was able to adduce some nondiscriminatory reasons for closing, the courts
have been reluctant to uphold a Board finding that the shutdown was dis-
criminatory, despite indications that unionization actually caused or ac-
celerated the employer's decision to close.' 8
"1 See NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1954)
(dictum); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1941)
(dictum).
12 See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
'3 Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1943) (refer-
ring to the discharge of a single employee).
14 Cf. NLRB v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, Inc., 223 F.2d 748, 749 (5th
Cir. 1955) ; Sahmn, The Discharge for Union Activities, 12 LAB. L.J. 325, 326 (1961).
15 See, e.g., NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir.
1961) ; NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1952).
16 See NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., supra note 15, at 292; New England
Web, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 49 L.R.R.M. 1620 (1962), 1962 CCH N.L.R.B.
1f 10929. But see NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961).
'7 See NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, Inc., supra note 15, at 292 (plant ex-
pansion plans); Ohio Hoist & Mfg. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 561, 570 (1954) (plans to
hire new workers).
'8 See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Jays Foods,
Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961); Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB,
211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954).
RECENT CASES
Part of this reluctance springs from the courts' conclusion that an
employer may consider unionization in the abstract as one economic factor
justifying a shutdown,19 and thus withhold from the union the opportunity
to conform its demands to the company's economic condition.20 On the
other hand, the Board maintains that unionization alone does not warrant
the conclusion that demands will be prohibitive. This approach does not
impose an unreasonable burden on the employer since the General Counsel
has refused even to issue a complaint against a company when, before
closing, it had supplied the union with data substantiating its claim of finan-
cial distress, and the union had rejected its offer to extend the existing
contract as an alternative to closing.21 Furthermore, the Board's position
does not prevent an employer from ceasing business for any legitimate rea-
son, including inability to meet wage demands, but rather assures workers
that a decision to unionize will not of itself justify a shutdown, and that the
employer will at least listen to their collective demands. 22 Even when an
employer is in economic difficulty, if the General Counsel can show that
this same general economic situation had not convinced it to close before
the union activity, the employer should be required to indicate the factor,
other than unionization, that caused or accelerated the shutdown.2
Applying the foregoing considerations to the present facts, even though
Darlington was losing money, 4 the Board's decision that the shutdown
was discriminatorily motivated is substantiated by the evidence. The com-
pany admitted that unionization was a factor in closing; 25 thus, the Board's
finding reinforces its determination that unionization in the abstract is not
a valid economic ground. In addition, during the organization drive the
19 See NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., supra note 18, at 172; NLRB v. Lassing,
284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961).
2 0 These decisions are contrary to a basic purpose of national labor legislation:
to bring "employers and employees together, . . to discuss rind argue out their
difficulties. . . ." 79 CONG. REc. 7673 (remarks of Senator Walsh).
2 1 See Administrative Decision of the General Counsel, 1961 CCH N.L.R.B.
f 10345.
22 As a result, the Board held that a fortiori a discriminatory shutdown violates
§8(a) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (refusal to -bargain in good
faith). Instant case at 16.
23 An analogy can be drawn to the firing of a worker who is aprominent union
leader. Although an employer has a right to fire workers for any reason except
discrimination, when the employer grounds the firing on past acts that would have
justified dismissal but were condoned, the Board has concluded that the firing was
not due to these acts, but to the supervening union activity. See Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1943).
2 4 See instant case at 6-7. The company president cited several other questionable
economic factors to justify the shutdown: for example, that Japanese imports had
an adverse effect upon Darlington sales (this was not substantiated); and that the
plant was antiquated and required additional expenditures -to function effectively
(yet the company had made extensive renovations before the election). See Johanne-
sen, Case of the Runaway Mill: Darlington Manufacturing Company, 12 LAB. L.J.
1189, 1196-98 (1961). Compare Schoemer, Case of the Runaway Author: Professor
Johannesen's Article on the Darlington Case, 13 LAB. L.J. 356 (1962).
25 See instant case at 6-7.
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company repeatedly'threatened to shut down 28 and, prior to the election,
had spent large sums improving the plant2
7
Although the decision that the closing was discriminatory accords
with both Board and court precedent, the Board fashioned a new remedy
in ruling that liability for wages should extend past the date of a total shut-
down. When unfair practices are committed, section 10(c) of the Labor
Management Relations Act 28 authorizes the Board to act affirmatively to
effectuate the legislative policy in each case.2 9 Since the Board cannot
impose penalties,3 0 it attempts to restore as nearly as possible the situation
that would have existed absent the unfair practicesy3 without unduly bur-
dening the employer.3 2 Remedies which best protect against discriminatory
closings-those that return the worker to his old job-are impractical in
most cases. Recently, when the Board sought to enjoin a liquidation pend-
ing the conclusion of an unfair practice hearing,m the district court denied
such' relief since the dismantling was almost complete and an injunction
would have been futile.3 4 Even should the Board act quickly, courts will
rarely require an economically troubled employer to remain in business for
the indefinite period necessary to obtain Board decision.3 5 For obvious
reasons the Board itself has never ordered an employer to rebuild dis-
mantled operations or to reopen a permanently closed plant; 38 indeed,
such an exercise of power may be unauthorized.3 7  Reinstatement and back
pay are, therefore, the principal remedies for discriminatory closings.
26 See instant case at 5. The Board also found that at least twenty interrogations
and thirty threats to employees during the pre-election period had violated § 8(a) (1)
of the Labor Management Relations Act. See instant case at 5-6.
2 7 See instant case at 7.
2 8 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
" See NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 265 (1938),
30 See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) ; Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
3 1 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
32 See Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 959, 963 (4th Cir. 1938).
33 See Address by Frank W. McCulloch, Eighth Annual Joint Industrial Con-
ference, Michigan State University, April 19, 1962, 3 CCH LAB. L. REP. 8072.
34 See Phillips v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 43 CCH Lab. Cas. j[ 17280 (N.D. Ga.
1961).
35 The liquidation in the instant case was completed on December 13, 1956, yet
the final Board decision was not announced until October 18, 1962. A recent report
disclosed that in the average unfair labor practice case the time from charge to Board
decision is 393 days. Further, a case appealed through all administrative and judicial
channels may require from two to six years before an enforceable decision is entered.
See STAFF OF Suacomm. ON THE NLRB, op. cit. supra note 10, at'16-24.
86In R. C. Mahon Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1957), enforcement denied, 269 F.2d
44 (6th Cir. 1959), and in Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1952);
enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954), the Board ordered an employer to
restore its former mode of operations, but this did not require the rebuilding of
machinery. In NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1944),
in which a Board order to resume operations was enforced, no restoration of equip-
ment was necessary, and the shutdown was deemed only temporary.
3 T Cf. NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17, 19 (10th Cir. 1961); NLRB v.
Missouri Transit Co., 250 F.2d 261, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1957).
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Naturally, when a company closes only part of its business-whether
one department in a single plant or an entire plant in a group of plants-,
the Board has more leeway in formulating the remedy. If the employer
continues to use the type of work that the discharged employees had per-
formed and restoring the employees to their former positions would not
necessitate replacing dismantled machinery, the Board may order the
resumption of the abandoned operation in addition to the back pay award; 38
more commonly, the Board will order back pay until the employer offers an
equivalent position in another part of the business 
39 or in another plant.40
But when an employer ceases all its operations in order to avoid dealing
with a union, a reinstatement order would be impractical and onerous
since it would require the Board to order the employer to go back into
business.41 Before the present case, the Board also refused to extend past
the date of the discriminatory closing the monetary liability 42 of an em-
ployer that closed down entirely.43 The Board had thus needlessly created
the anomaly of an unfair labor practice without a remedy by failing to dis-
tinguish a discriminatory discharge preceding a valid closing, for which
back pay liability should extend only to the period between discharge and
closing,44 from a discriminatory discharge which is the closing itself, for
which liability should continue until the employees obtain substantially
equivalent employment.
The Board's divergent remedies in two recent cases of discriminatorily
motivated shutdowns highlight the frustration of national labor policy that
results from not extending pay liability beyond the date of closing when
the shutdown is complete. In Barbers Iron Foundry,45 since the company
had ceased all business operations, the Board rejected as punitive any back
pay liability past the shutdown date,46 and instead applied a pro forma
38 See cases cited note 36 supra.
39 See Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942).
40 See Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 172 (1957), enforced per
curiam, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); Wallick & Schwalm Co., 95 N.L.R-B. 1262,
1265 (1951), enforced, 198 F.2d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 1952).
41 See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
4 2 Monetary liability can be imposed on a company that has ceased all business
operations. Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 459 (1957).
4 3 See Colonial Fashions, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1204 (1954); Ray Nichols,
Inc., 15 N.L.R.B. 846, 858 (1939).
4 4 See Ox-Wall Products Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 49 L.R.RM. 1585
(1962), 1962 CCH N.L.R.B. 10896.
45126 N.L.R.B. 30 (1960).
46 The General Counsel suggested that back pay liability terminate at any of
four times: (a) when the parent company notifies the employees of the creation of
a preferential hiring list; (b) when the employees obtain substantially equivalent
employment elsewhere; (c) when the company would have subsequently closed the
plant for nondiscriminatory reasons; (d) after a reasonable period fixed by the Board,
for example six months. Id. at 32 n.4. The Board in the instant case seems to have
reconsidered the General Counsel's suggestions and formulated a remedy by com-
bining (a), (b), and (c).
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remedy 47 merely requiring the employer to notify the discharged workers
that if business were resumed their names would be placed on a preferential
hiring list.48 But, in Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills, Inc.,49 because the
employer continued to operate as a jobber after completely abandoning its
manufacturing business and dismantling its machines, the Board ordered
reimbursement of forty-seven displaced manufacturing employees for loss
of wages from the time of shutdown until they could acquire substantially
equivalent employment.50 In both cases the ceased operations would have
continued but for the workers' union activity, the employer had per-
manently terminated the operations which had employed the discharged
workers, and the effect on the employees was the same; yet, instead of
examining whether a monetary liability could be borne and would be an
appropriate remedy in each case, the Board automatically dismissed even
the possibility of indemnification in the case of cessation of all operations.
The Board decision in the present case to continue back pay liability
beyond the closing date will give pause to solvent companies considering
hasty shutdowns, for stockholders will not share in liquidation proceeds
until back pay liabilities have been satisfied.51 Had the Board merely
extended the employer's pay liability for an arbitrary period, for example,
six months past closing,52 it would have exacted a shutdown fee rather
than adhere to its established policy of formulating remedies that seek to
restore the situation antedating the unfair conduct.53 Although the lia-
bility imposed in the present case could conceivably endure for the lives of
some workers, it is neither punitive nor excessive, since the employees are
4 7 The House subcommittee recently chided the Board for giving "slap on the
wrist" remedies. This rebuke may have been partially responsible for the Board's
change of position. See STAFF OF THE SuBcomm. ox TiE NLRB, op. cit. Mpra note
10, at 2.
48 Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30, 33-34 (1960).
49126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960).
50 Member Leedom joined the majority in Bonnie Lass apparently because, as
distinguished from Barbers Iron Foundry, the company was still in existence. In the
instant case he continued to draw this artificial distinction and would have tolled
the back pay liability at the date of closing. See note 4 supra. Yet, the Darlington
company had deposited between $300,000 and $400,000 in a New York bank to provide
for an unfavorable back pay award. In addition, the company had distributed
$3,750,000 to stockholders as a liquidation 'dividend. See Johannesen, supra note 24,
at 1198.
51 Most -states have statutes extending the corporate existence beyond the dis-
solution date in order to enable suits to be prosecuted by and against the corporation,
and to xvind up corporate affairs. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953) ;
N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw §29, N.Y. STOCK Coa'. LAW §§105(8), (9); S.C. CODE
§§ 12-601, 12-644 (1952). See also Hornstein, Voluntary Dissohtionz--A New De-
velopment in Intracorporate Abuse, 51 YALE L.. 64, 70-77 (1941). The Board
partially relied on the S.C. CODE in holding Darlington liable.. Instant case at 9.
52 See note 46 supra.
53 See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
RECENT CASES
required to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages -4 and the Board has
retained the right to modify or suspend the back pay provisions in the
event that the company at some future time can show that changed economic
conditions would have forced a shutdown or layoff if operations had
continued. 55
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-CoRPoRAToN NOT EN-
TITLED TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVIEGE IN FEDERAL DISCoVERY
PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff in a civil antitrust suit sought discovery of correspondence
sent from defendant corporation to its counsel. In allowing discovery, the
district court held that a corporation cannot claim the attorney-client
privilege. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp.
771 (N.D. Ill.), upheld on rehearing, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
In order to promote the free exchange of information between client
and attorney, the common law has long recognized that if "(1) . . . legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived." 1 To be protected communications must not be
disclosed even inadvertently to third parties 2 and must have been prepared
primarily for the purpose of transmission to the attorney 8 Documents not
so prepared do not come within the privilege even if later communicated
to him.4 Although corporations are denied the privilege against self-
incrimination, they have been allowed to claim the attorney-client priv-
54The employees will have to use reasonable efforts to obtain work. See Efco
Mfg., Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1955). Although they need not move to another
locale to seek employment, see American Bottling Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1956),
they may be compelled to mitigate damages by accepting a less remunerative job if
they cannot find equivalent employment within a reaonable time, see NLRB v.
Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821
(1957); NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702, 705 (4th Cir. 1955).
55 See instant case at 18; Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 333
(1958); cf. NLRB v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1957); NLZB
v. Talladega Cotton Factory, 213 F.2d 209, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Wallace Corp v.
WLRB, 159 F.2d 952, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1947).
18 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2 8id. §2311.
88 id. § 2307.
4 See 8 id. § 2307, at 594.
5 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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ilege.0 Controversy has arisen over the scope of this privilege as regards
corporations, especially with the growth of corporate legal departments,
but implicit in every discussion has been the assumption that the privilege
is available to a corporate client.7 The court in the present case appears
to be the first to question this assumption, and it did so sua sponte, since
the parties treated the privilege as properly invoked by the defendant.8
The present decision was principally grounded on the court's con-
clusion 9 that "the confidential nature of communications . . . [that is]
so vital an element of the attorney-client privilege could never exist" 10 in
a large corporation, 1 where communications to counsel are purportedly
circulated among the officers and employees,' 2 and are subject to inspection
by the stockholders 13 and the state.14 This assertion of the impossibility
of secrecy in the corporate context seems unwarranted. It is highly unlikely
6 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954) ; United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) ; United States
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (dictum).
7 See, e.g., CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (Holtzoff,
J.); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, supra note 6; United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., supra note 6. See generally Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied
to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956).
8 Instant case at 772. The court did, however, consider briefs on this issue on
rehearing. 209 F. Supp. at 321-22.
0 The court reached its conclusion after examining only federal precedent. In-
stant case at 772-73. Although a federal court exercising federal question juris-
diction, as in the instant case, has the power to formulate its own rules of evidence,
FaD. R. Civ. P. 43(a), 62 COLUm. L. RaV. 1049 (1962); Mishkin, The Variousness
of "Federal Law": Conmpetence and Discretion in the Choice of Natimal and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Ray. 797, 798-801 (1957) ; cf. Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447, 465-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring), privileges might well be treated as
more substantive manifestations of state policy than general evidentiary rules. See
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusiot: Privileges in Federal Court
:Today, 31 TurL. L. R-v. 101 (1956). Since a federal law of privilege which differed
from the state law would tend to undermine the state policy of protecting certain
communications, a federal court should determine whether or not the federal right
can be enforced without formulating a separate federal privilege rule, or whether
or not Congress intended to displace state privileges. See Louisell, supra; Mishkin,
supra at 800 rlS. See also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 1030. Compare RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (definition of
"real property" in federal statute incorporates state law, but scope of incorporation
is federal question), with FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b) ("the deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action . . . ." (Emphasis added.)).
10 Instant case at 775.
11 Although the opinion in the instant case did not purport to be limited to large
corporations, its reasoning would probably not be considered applicable to the small
"family" corporation. Comnpare United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (un-
incorporated association may not invoke self-incrimination privilege), with I1n re
Subpena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (White rule not
applicable to small family partnership).
12 The court assumed that files of a corporation were open to inspection by
employees working in the corporation. Instant case at 774.
1Id. at 775. See generally 5 FLETCHER, PRVATE CORPORATONS §§ 2213-57
(perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).
14 Instant case at 775. See generally 14 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6788
(perm. ed. rev. repl. 1945).
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that the communications to which the attorney-client privilege is applicable
would be seen by any but a few officials or employees of the corporation. 15
If in fact a particular communication has been circulated among persons
who would not qualify as agents of the corporation for purposes of the
privilege, 16 its claim to protection is defeated, and the party seeking dis-
covery will normally be able to prove the disclosure by use of other dis-
covery mechanisms.' 7 It is also doubtful that a stockholder seeking inspec-
tion of the corporate books and records,'8 or the state exercising its
visitorial powers,19 would gain access to the files containing correspondence
with outside counsel if the corporation were able to invoke the attorney-
client privilege. No reported cases deal specifically with this problem, and
until such a right of inspection is recognized notwithstanding the privilege,
the court should not assume it as a ground for eliminating the privilege.
The present decision was secondarily premised on the "purely per-
sonal" nature of the attorney-client privilege. In its common-law genesis,
argued the court, the attorney-client privilege "is so intimately entwined
with its great partner the privilege against self-incrimination that a person
reading its history begins to doubt that two separate privileges ever were
originally intended." 2 0 Since the privilege against self-incrimination is
purely personal and may not be claimed by other than natural persons,
the equally personal attorney-client privilege should also be available only
to natural persons.2 1 However, the attorney-client privilege was recognized
before the privilege against self-incrimination 22 and is based on different
principles. Whereas the self-incrimination privilege-developed in response
to the abuses of the canonical courts and the Court of Star Chamber 23 _
seeks to protect the physical and mental sanctity of the individual, the
attorney-client privilege is usually justified on the ground that in our
complex society it is essential that parties be able to obtain sound legal
15 See Brief for Defendant, Motion for Rehearing, pp. 34-39, instant case.
'1 It is noteworthy that clients are not denied the privilege even though their
counsel may be a large law firm in which a number of lawyers, secretaries, and clerks
see the correspondence. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (CPA
employed in law office); 8 WIGmoaRi op. cit. stpra note 1, § 2301 and cases cited
therein.
17 The scope of dissemination could be learned through depositions of employees
or interrogatories addressed to the corporation. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30, 31, 33.
18 Stockholders usually may only inspect material documents for a proper purpose.
5 FLCHER, PRivATE CoRraRAoNs § 2214 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952)).
19 In United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), the federal
government sought inspection of the correspondence of a corporation, but conceded
that such inspection would not include privileged correspondence. This case arose
after it had been determined that a corporation could not invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); accord, CAB v.
Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (privilege upheld in federal
investigation).
20 Instant case at 775.
21 Id. at 773.
22 Compare 8 WIGMoaPF, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2250, with 8 id. § 2290.
2 8 id. § 2250.
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advice in confidence: "[T] he social good derived from the proper perform-
ance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to out-
weigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence in
specific cases." 24 In the view of the framers of the Model Code of Evi-
dence, a prerequisite to the furnishing of sound legal advice is the fullest
freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts; to induce clients
to make such communications, the privilege of preventing subsequent dis-
closure is said to be a necessity.2 5
This justification seems particularly applicable to corporations.
2 6
Unlike individuals, who in their day-to-day affairs are usually able to stay
within the law when guided only by their moral sense of right and wrong,
27
corporations, by reason of their size and the nature of their dealings,
28
must frequently turn to counsel in order to conform their actions to the
law.2 9 The privilege exists as much to prevent future illegality, by inform-
ing clients of the legal consequences of intended courses of action, as to
facilitate the furnishing of legal advice regarding past conduct.3 0 Only in
the latter sense is the privilege analogous to the protection against self-
incrimination. If the attorney-client privilege were merely a means of
averting indirect incrimination of the client, it is difficult to see why the
common law never recognized the privilege of the priest and penitent or the
physician and patient. 3'
A court might readily become impatient with a large corporation which
invokes the attorney-client privilege to shield a substantial number of docu-
ments from discovery,3 2 especially in an antitrust suit where the need for
discovery is so acute. In particular, the court in the instant case may
have been attempting to curtail the purported practice of some corporations
to use counsel as conduits of information from lower-echelon employees
to their superiors so that only the lawyer is privy to all the facts making up
the illegal activity-even the directors of the corporation know only the
general outlines of the corporate activity and its legal consequences.3
2 4 MoDEL CODE OF EvIENCE rule 210, comment a, at 147 (1942).
25 Ibid.
26 The court on rehearing conceded the advisability of such a privilege for cor-
porations but indicated that it would have to be "created by a court with greater
authority . . . or by the legislative branch . . . ." 209 F. Supp. at 325.
2 7 See CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 130 (1921).
28This Comment is directed only to large corporations. Small corporations,
which are, in effect, incorporated partnerships, obviously present different considera-
tions. See note 11 supra.
29 See Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235, 241 (1961);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Impli-
catioms for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1243 (1962).
30 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950).
318 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2380 (physician-patient); 8 id. § 2394
(priest-penitent).
32 In the instant case defendant invoked the privilege for over thirty lineal feet
of documents. Brief for Defendant, Motion for Rehearing, p. 2 n.1, instant case.
3 3See, e.g., RCA v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
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Conceivably, the present court completely withdrew the attorney-client
privilege from corporations because it viewed this problem as insoluble
under the existing privilege rules.
An intermediate position has since been taken by the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.34 In
that case the court refused to follow the instant case,35 but limited the
privilege to those corporate communications from employees who are in a
position "to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney
... , 36 If the employee is not in such a position, he would not, for
the purposes of the privilege, be acting for the client, but as a third party
witness.3 7 Some of the employees thus excluded would not have been
treated as agents of the corporation under the presently accepted rule,38
but the Westinghouse formulation also removes the protection from com-
munications of subordinate executives who lack authority to act upon the
advice of counsel, even though such executives may be the only persons who
can readily inform counsel of the workings of their departments.
Both Westinghouse and the present case have established new rules
which will operate automatically to prevent the use of the privilege as a
cloak for illegal activity. At the same time, however, they will destroy the
privilege for many corporations which seek legal advice in good faith. The
need for such a drastic step is not at all clear. Since a court is free to
examine correspondence claimed to be privileged, it can detect most schemes
to use counsel as conduits of information within the corporation. If the
lawyer was expected to pass information on to a third party, the element
of confidentiality would be lacking, and a court could deny the privilege
under the existing rules.3 9 Courts have successfully applied these rules
to corporations even when involved in complex antitrust litigation. 40
U 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
3 5 "[T]he availability of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so
long and has been so generally accepted that I must recognize that it does exist2'
Id. at 484. Accord, Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 31 U.S.L. WFEK 2394 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 22, 1963) ; cf. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 490 n.5
(1960) ; Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 370-71 (1959);
Swendig v. Washington Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 331 (1924).
36210 F. Supp. at 485.
3 7 Compare Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (claim of attorney-
client privilege rejected as to memoranda of interviews with employees who witnessed
accident, and employees referred to as "witnesses").
3s When an employee is relating facts which were not obtained within the scope
of his employment, e.g., those obtained when the employee was a witness to an accident
in which corporate property is involved, the communication to the attorney is not
privileged. See note 37 supra. See generally Simon, vtpra note 7, at 958-66; Note,
56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 242-43 (1961).
39 See McCoRMiCK, EvIDENcE § 95, at 191 (1954), and cases cited therein.
4 oSee, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). And
insofar as the attorney-client privilege is premised on the assumption that encouraging
free disclosure to counsel will notify clients of the illegality of proposed activities
and thus constrain them to alter their course of action, see notes 24-30 mrpra and
accompanying text, the policies of the antitrust laws would seem to be served by the
preservation of the privilege for corporations. Compare note 9 supra.
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Continued application of the privilege, with appropriate policing, would
allow any employee of a corporation, acting as an agent of the corpora-
tion within the scope of his authority, to communicate freely with an at-
torney on any matter which was referred to counsel for the primary purpose
of obtaining legal advice, subject to the crucial provisos of confidentiality,
waiver, and good faith.
SEAMEN-COUNSEL FEs RECOVERABLE AS DAMAGES FOR FAmuRE
To PAY MAiNTENANCE AND CURE
In a suit in admiralty, a seaman sought to recover counsel fees as
damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure on the ground that re-
spondents' failure either to acknowledge or deny his claim for maintenance
and cure necessitated his hiring an attorney and resorting to the courts.
The lower federal courts denied this element of damage, but the Supreme
Court held that counsel fees are recoverable when the default of the ship-
owner is willful and persistent. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962), reversing 291 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1961).1
The right of a seaman to maintenance and cure is a part of the general
maritime law 2 and has developed into an almost absolute right 3 similar to
workmen's compensation 4 Seamen are entitled to a minimum daily living
I Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented, taking the view that counsel fees should
be recoverable only if the shipowner's refusal stemmed from wanton and intentional
disregard for the seaman's rights. These Justices also dissented on the second issue
of the case-whether the seaman's earnings as a taxi driver during convalescence
should be set off against a maintenance and cure recovery. They would have limited
recovery to the seaman's need. The majority, however, reversing the lower federal
courts, 200 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff'd, 291 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1961), held
that set-off would allow shipowners to delay and ignore seamen's claims and force
them to seek employment during recovery, thus permitting shipowners to minimize
losses at the expense of seamen. Compare Yates v. Dann, 223 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1955),
with Perez v. Suwanee S.S. Co., 239 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam), and
Wilson v. United States, 229 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1956). For discussion of the
lower court decisions on this issue, see 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 316 (1962) ; 47 VA. L. REv.
1077 (1961).
2 See, e.g., De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943) ;
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) ; Murphy v. Light, 257 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1958) ;
GILMoRE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-6, at 253-54 (1957).
a Instant case at 531-32; Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911,
914 (2d Cir. 1960).
4 See GiLmoRE & BLACK, op. cit. supra nQte 2, § 6-6, at 253. State workmen's
compensation laws are unconstitutional as applied to maritime workers, Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1917), and the federal act passed to provide
workmen's compensation for maritime employees explicitly excludes masters and ship's
crew from coverage. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44
Stat 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1958). After Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
and before the passage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, Congress twice attempted to utilize state workmen's compensation law in the
maritime field. Both attempts were struck down by the Supreme Court. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W. C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). To avoid the consequences of Jensen, the "maritime and
local" distinction was established whereby the state compensation law was applicable
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allowance and to essential care until they reach maximum recovery.5 If
the shipowner breaches the duty to provide maintenance and cure, the
seaman has a cause of action for any additional injury sustained as a result
of the refusal to pay.0 Prior to the present case a recovery under this
cause of action was available only when the refusal to pay caused or
aggravated a physical illness or injury, and was limited to necessary ex-
penses and compensation for the additional injury.
7
In ordinary tort actions, recovery of litigation costs is generally limited
by statute to specified items and amounts which do not include the cost
of legal representation; 8 nevertheless, counsel fees are frequently awarded
under the guise of exemplary damages.9 Conversely, in maintenance and
cure actions, "extra damages" have not been permitted, but admiralty courts
have discretion to allow recovery of counsel fees as costs.,, In view of the
nature and history of the right to maintenance and cure, legal expenses
should be awarded either as special damages or costs, for the minimum
reimbursement to which seamen are entitled is necessarily reduced when
they are compelled to bring suit. The present decision bypassed the
if an injured employee had no direct concern with commerce or navigation. Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). "Maritime and local' was replaced
by the concept of the "twilight zone" which gave the maritime worker an election
between federal and state compensation when it could not be determined in advance
which would apply. Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). For
further discussion and history of workmen's compensation in the maritime field, see
GrxoRE & BLACK, op. cit. supra §§,6-45 to -57; 50 CALF. L. Rxv. 342 (1962).
5 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517-18 (1949); Reardon v. California
Tanker Co., 260 F.2d 369, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 926 (1959);
United States v. Manzanillo, 190 F. Supp. 229, 233 (D. Ore. 1960).
I Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) ; see Mayo v.
United States War Shipping Administration, 82 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Pa. 1948); cf.
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942). The right of action in a
suit for failure to provide maintenance and cure is distinct from the maintenance and
cure right. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., .mpra; see Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1928) ; Ran v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 87 F. Supp. 853
(E.D. Pa. 1949).
7 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., supra note 6, at 371. When the failure
to pay causes or aggravates an injury, withholding of payment after notice of the
need for maintenance and cure is not excused by a good faith conviction that the
seaman did not have a legitimate claim. Sims v. United States War Shipping Ad-
ministration, 186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951).
8 Gordon v. Woods, 202 F.2d 476, 479-80 (1st Cir. 1953); United States v.
Hoffman Constr. Co., 163 F. Supp. 296, 297-98 (E.D. Wash. 1958). See generally
McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 61 (1935) ; 6 Moo, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 54.77[2] (2d ed.
1953).
9 In Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371-72 (1851), the Court
stated: "This doctrine about the right of the jury to include in their verdict, in
certain cases, a sum sufficient to indemnify the plaintiff for counsel fees and other
real or supposed expenses over and above taxed costs, seems to have been borrowed
from the civil law and the practice in the courts of admiralty." See McCo~micx,
op. cit. supra note 8, § 85.
10 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). The discretion of the admiralty
courts in allowing costs is now limited to statutory maxima. Weel v. United States,
68 F. Supp. 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Pero v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1945).
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problem of what constitutes costs," and awarded special damages, thus
abandoning the theory of prior cases that damages for failure to pay main-
tenance and cure may be recovered only when the failure caused or ag-
gravated physical injury.' 2
On its face, the majority opinion warrants a narrow reading to limit
recovery to situations in which the shipowner was, in the words of the
Court, "callous" or "willful and persistent" 13 in his failure to pay main-
tenance and cure. Such a reading, however, vitiates much of the decision's
impact; to avoid liability for attorney fees, shipowners need only attempt
to negotiate with seamen and refrain from conduct that could be charac-
terized as "callous." Nor is the dissent's suggested approach-to allow
counsel fees as exemplary damages only if the refusal to pay resulted from
"wanton and intentional disregard of the legal rights of the seaman" 14
any better on this score. But the dissent does validly object that there was
no evidence that the shipowner was in fact "callous" or that his neglect was
"willful and persistent." 15 Therefore, these words in the majority opinion
cannot be construed to limit the broader implications of the holding. Fur-
thermore, the purpose of maintenance and cure justifies a broad interpreta-
tion. Since shipowners are generally better able than seamen both to
evaluate the merits of claims and to bear the financial risk of paying them,'0
they should be required to satisfy all maintenance and cure claims to which
they have no reasonable defense. To impose absolute liability on ship-
owners for counsel fees, however, would go too far. To avoid liability
under such a rule, shipowners would have, to pay dubious claims which
could not be recouped in subsequent litigation in the likely event that the
seaman is judgment-proof. Thus, the shipowner should be required to pay
counsel fees only when, in the judgment of the court, his refusal to pay
maintenance and cure was unreasonable at the time of the request.
17
There are situations, however, in which the existence of a defense to a
seaman's claim should not justify a shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance
1128 U.S.C. §§ 1923, 1925 (1958) describes the costs taxable in admiralty. For
discussion of the taxing of counsel fees and the effects of statutes, see generally
United States v. Waters, 133 U.S. 208, 212 (1890) ; The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
377 (1869); The City of Augusta, 80 Fed. 297, 303-04 (1st Cir. 1897); Guardian
Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. R.R., 28 F.2d 233, 243-44 (8th Cir. 1928) (dictum),
rev'd, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
12 See instant case at 539-40 (dissenting opinion) ; see note 7 mepra and accom-
panying text.
13 Instant case at 530-31.
141d. at 540 (dissenting opinion).
15 Ibid. The seaman's claim was not completely ignored. The shipowner did
interrogate the master and the chief engineer, both of whom stated that the libelant
had never complained of an illness during his service on the ship.
16 Vaughan v. Atldnson, 291 F.2d 813, 819-20 (4th Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
'7 Vaughan v. Atldnson, 206 F. Supp. 575, 577 (E.D. Va. 1962) (dictum). See
generally EDELMAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH 48-62 (1960), for discussion of
the defenses that may be available to an action for maintenance and cure.
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and cure. If, for example, a clear claim for maintenance and cure is joined
with a disputed Jones Act or unseaworthiness claim, the shipowner should
be required to pay the undisputed maintenance and cure claim since this
voluntary payment would not constitute an admission of liability for the
other claims.18 Similarly, a dispute over the amount of maintenance and
cure due should not entitle a shipowner to refuse to pay the amount for
which he concedes liability. Thus, if a seaman claims $2000, and the ship-
owner admits only $1000, the owner should immediately pay the $1000 or
be held liable for counsel fees for the recovery of the entire claim. 19
Some limitation must be placed on the amount of counsel fees re-
coverable, for the seaman whose counsel fees will be reimbursed by the
shipowner has no reason to object to any contingent fee arrangement
proposed by his lawyer. The Supreme Court in the present case ap-
parently required that the counsel fees be reasonable, but declined to rule
on the matter since it was not considered below.2° On remand,21 the dis-
trict court found the fifty percent arrangement unreasonable and under-
took an independent evaluation of the worth of the legal services3P Al-
though the seaman's minimum recovery was thereby reduced by the amount
of the legal fee that he will have to pay himself, this seems justified to
protect shipowners from overreaching plaintiffs' counsel.
The present result fosters the desirable goal of simplifying the main-
tenance and cure remedy,23 thereby encouraging prompt payment, settle-
ment of claims, and avoidance of litigation. Another constructive step in
the same direction was the Court's rejection of the defense of set-off of
wages earned during the period that maintenance and cure was payable; 2 4
this eliminates another reason for shipowners to avoid prompt settlement
of claims.23 Apparently the Court is willing to see the conversion of main-
18 Cf. Sulentich v. Interlake S.S. Co., 257 F.2d 316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 885 (1958).
19 This in fact occurred in the instant case. 206 F. Supp. at 577 (respondents'
claim that set-off constituted a bona fide defense held untenable because of lack of
good faith).2 0 Instant case at 531 n.3.
21206 F. Supp. at 577-79.
22The court advanced no formula to compute reasonable fees, but based its
determination on "the amount of work, the nature and character of the legal services,
the result accomplished, the complexity of the issues, the various courts through
which litigation . . . progressed, the amount in controversy, the fact that the matter
was handled upon a contingent fee arrangement and, . . . the briefs filed in the
appellate courts . . . ." Id. at 579. Attorney fees are recoverable in workaen's
compensation, a field often analogized to maintenance and cure. See note 4 mipra
and accompanying text Statutes require that fees be reasonable or be approved
by the commission administering the workmen's compensation act. See, e.g., 44 Stat.
1438 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §928 (1958); FLA. STAT. §440.34 (1952).
23 See instant case at 537-38 (dissenting opinion).
2 4 Instant case at 531-34; The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54,
90-93 (1962) ; see note 1 supra.
25 Other indications of an apparent trend to limit shipowners' defenses are a
broad definition of "in the service of the ship," Warren v. United States, 340 U.S.
523, 529-30 (1951) ; an unwillingness to call a seaman's conduct "willful misconduct,"
Gardner v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 129 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 227
F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1955); cf. Warren v.. United. States, supra at 528-29; and the
heavy burden placed on the shipowner in proving a release, Garrett v. Moore-
McCormac Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246-48 (1942).
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tenance and cure into a more nearly absolute liability, an end justified by
the relative economic positions of seamen and shipowners and by the
absence of maritime workmen's compensation.
SECURITIES-INsmEn's SIMULTANEOUS ISSUANCE OF PUT AND
OALIT OPTIONS HELD NOT A PURCHASE AND SALE WITHIN SECTION
16 (b) OF THE SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT
A director of the Fruehauf Trailer Company received $5,000 in pre-
miums for his simultaneous issuance of two one-year call options,' each
on 500 shares of his Fruehauf stock, and a one-year put option 2 on another
500 shares.3 All three options were transferable and could be exercised
at the market price of the stock on the date the options were issued.4 A
stockholder brought a derivative action under section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 - to recover for the company the director's profits
on these transactions. The district court granted the director's motion
for summary judgment.6 In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the simultaneous issuance of matched put and call options
did not constitute a purchase and sale within the meaning of section 16(b).7
Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
To prevent the "unfair use" of inside information, section 16(b) pro-
vides that any profit realized by a "director, or officer . . . from any pur-
chase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of . . .
[his corporation] within any period of less than six months . . . shall
1"A call contract is a negotiable bearer contract paid for by the buyer upon
delivery of the contract, giving him the right, at his option, to buy on 'call' from the
maker or seller of such contract a certain number of shares of stock at a fixed price,
on or before a stipulated date." FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS
24-25 (1959).
2 "A put option is a negotiable bearer contract paid for by the buyer upon delivery
of the contract, giving him the right, at his option to deliver to the maker or seller
of the contract a certain number of shares of stock at a fixed price on or before a
stipilated date." Id. at 20.
3 The director owned 2,000 shares of Fruehauf stock. Had he lacked sufficient
stock to cover the call option, he could have been prosecuted under the section of the
act which proscribes short sales. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(a), 48 Stat. 891
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1958). A short sale occurs when a person contracts to
sell stock which he then does not own, but which he hopes to acquire in time to make
his promised delivery. See LEFF.ER, THE STOCK MARKET 299 (2d ed. 1957).
4 One call option was never exercised; the director sold the put option to 'a broker
more than six months after he issued it. Instant case at 424.
5 Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b)
(1958).
0200 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
7 The court also rejected plaintiff's arguments that the defendant's dealings vio-
lated section 16(c), which prohibits short sales and "sales against the box," and that
the defendant's "straddle," see note 27 infra, constituted an arbitrage transaction
prohibited by Rule 16d-1 of the General Rules and Regulations of the SEC.
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inure to and be recoverable by the [corporation] . *..." 8 "Purchase"
includes "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire," 9 and "sale"
includes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." "o
Since it would be extremely difficult to prove actual use of inside
information, the statute does not require such a showing; moreover, the
insider's motives are immaterial. 1 A purchase and sale occurring within
six months exposes the insider to suit by the company or, if the company
fails to take action, by a stockholder.' 2 The courts have been flexible in
interpreting the purchase and sale clauses for 16(b) purposes,'3 focusing
in each instance on the opportunity presented for the use of inside informa-
tion.14 Under 16(b), the courts have seldom dealt with options, and never
with put and call options; the present case was thus one of first impression.
The court reasoned that a purchase and sale could not have occurred
until both the optionor's rights and obligations became fixed.15 Since the
mere issuance of an option fixes the optionor's obligations but not his rights,
the court found no purchase and sale in the present case.1 In support of
this position, it seized upon language in another Second Circuit case-Blau
v. Ogsbury 17-that "when fixing the six-months' period, the time when the
alleged insider's rights and obligations become fixed [is] controlling in the
application of the statute.' "18 However, Blast arose in a context--em-
ployee stock options-entirely different from that of the present case,19
SSecurities Exchange Act §16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b)
(1958).
9) Securities Exchange Act § 3(a) (13), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(13) (1958).
10 Securities Exchange Act § 3(a) (14), 48 Stat. 882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(14) (1958).
11 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943) ; 2 Loss, SzcusTrms REGuLATION S 1041 n.14 (1961).
12 See Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1958) ; cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., supra note 11.
'3 See Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.Zd 426 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). But see Ferraiolo
v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
14 See Note, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950). Compare Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra
note 13, with Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, supra note 13.
15 Instant case at 424.
-6 Apparently, the court was using the term "right" in the sense of a "legally
enforceable claim of a person against another that the other shall do a given act or
shall not do a given act." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42, comment b (1934).
In the present case the insider-optionor's obligations were fixed at the time he issued
the options, i.e., he had to deliver stock to the call optionee and money to the put
optionee upon demand. However, he would not have had a legally enforceable claim
against the optionees until they made their demands.
17 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
I8 Instant case at 424.
19 In Blau, the president of a large firm was given a long-term unassignable
option in 1942 to purchase company stock at a specified price as part of his salary.
In 1945, he mailed notice that he intended to exercise the option. In December 1948,
he tendered payment for and received the stock. The plaintiff alleged that there had
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and the language of the statute itself in no way requires that the insider's
rights and obligations be fixed as a prerequisite to the characterization of a
transaction as a purchase and sale.
Apart from its reliance on the fixed rights and obligations language
of Blau, the court based its conclusion that no purchase and sale had oc-
curred on the fact that if simultaneously issued put and call options both
lapse unexercised-as here they did-there has been no change in the
ownership of the underlying securities.2 Conceptually, it may be difficult
to find that a purchase has occurred when there has been no actual transfer
of ownership. Nevertheless, the policy underlying section 16(b) makes
it appropriate that "every transaction which can reasonably be defined as
a purchase be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly
lend itself to . . . [insider] speculation." 21 Since the Securities Ex-
change Act defines purchase and sale to include contracts to buy and sell
equity securities of the insider's corporation,
2 2 and an option is a contract,2 3
it is at least arguable on the basis of the statutory definitions alone that the
simultaneous issuance of put and call options constitutes a purchase and
sale within the meaning of the statute.24
Such a construction of purchase and sale is justified by the inviting
potential for profit from the use of inside information in the sale of put and
call options.2 5 For example, an insider having reason to believe that his
been a purchase and sale within six months because in July 1948 the optionee-
defendant had sold some company stock. In rejecting the plaintiff's contention, the
court held that the purchase occurred in 1945 when he notified the company of his
intention to exercise the option. The court had three dates to consider-1942, when
the insider received the option; 1945, when he notified the company of his intention
to exercise it; and 1948, when he tendered payment. It is highly unlikely that any
court would have found that a purchase had occurred in 1942. To decide the case,
a court had only to determine whether or not a purchase had occurred in 1948.
Moreover, the insider-optionee could not have profited from the mere receipt of an
unassignable option; his profit would accrue when he exercised the option and then
sold the newly acquired stock at a price above the option price. It was only in 1945
that he was willing to bind himself to exercise his options. In contrast, in the instant
case the insider-optionor's information was a significant factor, and his profit was
realized, at the moment that he issued the options. See text accompanying notes 25-31
infra. It was at this point that both parties-optionor and optionee-made a prediction
regarding the stock's future fluctuations, the insider-optionor gambling that the
price would remain stable and that options would not be exercised.
20 Instant case at 424.
21 Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959) (purporting to state the position of the Second Circuit on this issue).
22 See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
23 1 CoRBin, CONTRACTs §§ 259-60 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 24, com-
ment c (1932) ; 1 Wn=STON, CONTRACTS § 61A (3d ed. 1957).
2
4 This was the SEC's position in the present case. Brief for the SEC as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 6-7. The only specific references in the Securities Exchange Act to puts
and calls are in §§9(b)-(d), which empower the SEC to regulate transactions in
which puts, calls, and other options are acquired in connection with dealings in stock.
48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§78i(b)-(d) (1958).
25 There was conflict in the present case over the amount of the defendant's
profit and the extent to which he would have been liable had the decision gone the
other way. Compare Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 11-12 with Reply Brief for
Defendant-Appellee, p. 7.
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company's stock will fluctuate very little during the next six months 2 6 may
be tempted to sell a "straddle" 27 on his holdings. At the end of the six-
month period, if his expectation is accurate, he will have both the stock
and the premiums realized from the sale of the options.28 His profit will be
greatest if both options lapse unexercised, and the odds are in his favor-
only two out of every five options are ever exercised, and only one is exer-
cised at a profit to the optionee.2 9 The optionor's profit is reduced when
one option is exercised or when he pays a third party to assume his obliga-
tion under the option,30 but this does not reduce the desirability of inter-
preting 16(b) to cover the situation.
The fact that the options, as in the present case, may run for a period
longer than the customary six months 3- does not decrease the possibility of
profit from the use of inside information. The optionor himself may be
anxious to sell a long-term option since his premium will exceed that for
a six-month option. And as long as the option is transferable the insider
is protected; should he obtain inside information of an impending fluctua-
tion in the price of the stock, he may be able to pay someone else to assume
his obligation. His profit will be diminished, as in the case when only one
of the options is exercised; but, if he has truly "advance" information, the
amount he must pay to induce a third party to assume his obligation may
fall short of the original premium he received.
Only if purchase and sale is interpreted to cover the simultaneous is-
suance of put and call options will the statutory purpose be effectuated in all
three situations-when both options lapse unexercised, when one is exer-
cised, and when the optionor sells his obligation to a third party.3 2  Al-
26 Most options are issued for a six-month period, although occasionally they are
issued for only thirty, sixty, or ninety days. SEC, REPORT ON PUT AND CALL OP-
TIONS 48 (1961).
27 A straddle is a combination of a put and call option sold for a single price.
FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 34 (1959).
28 The higher the premium the optionor receives, the greater the stock's fluctuation
will have to be before the option will be exercised. For example, if a party sells two
options--one a put and the other a call at $10 per share-, each on 100 shares of stock
selling at $10 a share, he is gambling that the options will not be exercised. If the
market value rises sufficiently the call will be exercised, and if the stock goes down
far enough the put will be exercised. If the optionee paid $100 for his option, he will
prefer not to exercise it until the stock goes above 20; only when that happens will he
be able to recoup his initial outlay. Since the price the optionor receives for the option
is a function of the optionee's expectations regarding the stock's movements as well as
his own, the optionor may not be able to achieve for himself as advantageous a position
as it appears he might in theory.
" SEC, REPORT ON PUT AND CALL OPTIoNs 45 (1961).
30 Even when both options are exercised the optionor does not actually lose any
money; he still retains the premiums he received for the sale of the options. Hence
the diminution of profit spoken of here refers to the profit the optionor might have
realized had he sold the stock on the open market (in the case of a call) rather than
to the optionee at the option price (which will be below the market price). For
example, if an optionor issued a call option at 25 which was exercised when the stock
reached 30, he "lost!' the five point profit he might have made by selling the stock
on the open market. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 16, instant case.
31 See note 26 supra.
32 The analysis here would not only favor the extension of liability under section
16(b) to cover the situation in which the insider issues matched put and call options,
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though, as a matter of fact, insiders have not traded extensively in put and
call options, 3 still the policy underlying 16(b) clearly demands that this
avenue for insider profits be closed.
34
but also the situation in which he combines the issuance of a call option with an actual
purchase, or the issuance of a put option with an actual sale, within a six-month
period. The same policy considerations pertain. In fact, in the case of an actual
purchase followed by the issuance of a call option, it is easier to see that the insider
might be tempted to manipulate the price of the stock downward (or upward if there
is a put combined with an actual sale) so that the option would not be exercised.
In the matched put and call option situation the optionor's concern is that the price
of the stock remain the same.
33 See SEC, REPORT N PUT AND CALL OmoINs 55 (1961) ; Note, 69 YALE L.J.
868, 869 n.6 (1960).
34 Cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943):
We must suppose that the statute was intended to be thorough-going, to
squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a
standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a
fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his
duty.
